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Abstract. 
On the basis of the problem of the possible compulsory nature of vaccines against Covid-
19, this paper considers the sources that allow us to justify the imposition of collective 
measures. The social contract theory provides a rational basis for the universality of 
ethical and natural law obligations, including conditional respect for a protected domain 
of individual physical and moral integrity. However, the practical application of the 
covenant is subject to the uncertainty of what effective consequences the policies have. 
Ethical principles show the problem of application in the environment of epistemological 
uncertainty. Only in a free society, with free scrutiny and deliberation, can justified 
knowledge be achieved that allows social measures to be agreed upon. The characteristics 
of the case that is the subject of this article lead to the conclusion that Covid-19 vaccines 
are not ethically obligatory, universally, but they can generate reasoned health measures, 
promotion, and limitations, based on proven positive effects, as a technical matter. 
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What are the bases of social obligation? Under what conditions can conduct be 
imposed on the constituent individuals of a society? Around the current problem of 
Covid-19 vaccines, an analysis of the ethical and epistemological problems involved is 
proposed. The modern theory of the social contract makes it possible to trace the ethical 
and natural law obligations, but its practical application requires an agreement on what is 
the justified knowledge for society as a whole (science). However, it is not possible to 
answer that question if it is not answered by a free society: where information and debate 
cannot be effectively controlled by any power or minority.  
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The conclusion is the following. These Covid-19 vaccines are not ethically 
binding. They have no basis in natural law. But measures can be imposed by sanitary 
prudence. This is reached on the basis of the theory of the original pact of a society, where 
rights would be established and the conditions for imposing socially beneficial 
obligations would be determined. With a reinforced core of freedoms, conditions would 
be imposed and, in this case, they are not fulfilled. All this according to the criteria of 
justified knowledge (science), in a society formed by free and rational individuals that 
maintain a democratic deliberation in the sense of Habermas: free, equal individuals, with 
mutual recognition and that wish to reach an agreement. There remains, then, the 
possibility of imposing restrictions strictly based on health justifications: basically the 
possibility of contagion, as a technique with necessarily scientific justification, with 
political decision, subjected to public debate and to the control of the division of powers. 
What follows is an explanation of this thesis. 
The first thing is to avoid the search for foundations by examples, which is clearly 
incorrect as Kant demonstrated. The example, in order to be an example, is an example 
of a previously established norm. It can show what is being defended, make us understand 
its consequences, but not support it. And also to flee from a kind of strange reasoning, 
which is found even in expert opinions: supporting that the obligatory nature or not would 
not be raised as long as people do not raise a relevant opposition against the injection of 
the vaccine. Then, any behaviour to which citizens oppose should become compulsory. 
It does not make sense. 
To impose the ethical obligatory nature of the vaccine? Those who answer yes can 
rely on three sources, with more or less interpretations. Utilitarianism, civic virtue, 
instrumental rationalism. I review them. 
The utilitarian school, which in many aspects is the basis of our societies, strongly 
proposes it: as a society we fight for the welfare of the majority, the maximum happiness 
of the greatest number (Sandel brilliantly explains the basics of this school and other 
options), and before this principle we must all oblige ourselves, as morality of the 
common welfare. Not to do so exposes others to risk. Consequently, there should be a 
social obligation, imposed de iure and de facto, administered by the State, that is, by the 
monopolistic organism of the legitimated power with which we have endowed ourselves. 
To question it is to deny science and let the contagions continue. To oppose it is to place 
oneself on the margins of the community. 
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Aristotle defended the concept of justice as giving what is deserved. Personal 
virtue, in society, is to comply with this rule of justice. Education: training in virtue. 
Vaccination? Yes, as long as it is socially beneficial. And to reward it as long as it is 
virtuous. Of course, punish if it is not carried out. 
The argumentation of both positions coincides in a nucleus: directing politics 
towards individual preference, considering the different conceptions of happiness and the 
importance of collectivity. They differ in unanimity or diversity, in the normative burden. 
As if Aristotle established a universal nature, while Bentham simply counted majorities. 
In short, being virtuous and measuring the world by the amount of preference achieved 
would coincide. As a kind of joint, tentative journey towards a social future. Saving means 
to give priority to the ends of maximum happiness, in Bentham's way: an accounting of 
happiness and suffering. At the base of utilitarianism beats Schumpeter's concept of 
democracy, developed as in a market where votes choose the political offer (of 
politicians), in the same way that the sale and purchase is carried out when the demand 
accepts a price and quantity of offer.  
This conception is not, however, strictly sustainable. It is not only that voters could 
choose any political offer, even if it were against human rights; but it is not possible for 
us to build and base today's society on the basis of subjective preferences, aggregate or 
not. As Schumpeter recognizes when speaking of opposing interests that do not seek 
compromise, we would be in the middle of the permanent debate, of the struggle of 
interests of minorities and majorities, where there is no collective consensus and we make 
the difference of opinions the basis.  
Elster claims that rationality yields indeterminate results. Isaiah Berlin 
emphasizes the idea that, in the face of multiple, competing human ends, there is often no 
common measure. Indeed, uncertainty is present in individual and social life so that we 
cannot reach a definitive solution in the face of the available options. If we have happiness 
as a criterion of equity, given the insurmountable differences between people, then the 
fact of power would be justified. Whoever wins, would have his conditions legitimised. 
The law of numbers would be imposed, including the capacity of the media to form 
majorities. Everything would be possible, but always against the weak. What prevents 
deciding against those who cannot oppose effectively? A vaccinated majority would be 
enough to force an obligatory nature. What's more, how can fundamental rights be 
founded on the basis that they are useful? It is contradictory.  
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So, can enforceability be based on instrumental reason? Or can we base it on the 
public interest embodied in the State? In the world of technology in which we live, the 
possibility of realization seems to be enough to do so. Wouldn't we be in a triumph of 
instrumental reason? Like the myth posed in the Enlightenment. A Ulysses chained to the 
mast that abandons everything that is not an instrument or a benefit (reread, of course, 
Adorno and Horkheimer). A machinery that mutilates men, we are told, and that puts an 
end to free reflection. Where everything is technique and the reason of taking means 
disposes of everything and everyone, where values are absorbed as products of applied 
science (Marcuse). In this idea, the proposal of vaccines by science would be enough to 
produce its obligatory nature.  
Now, whether one agrees or not, whether one answers yes or no, it can never be 
done as the domain of technology: the means must not be the end, man must freely 
establish his objectives. Industry cannot decide ethics, but must be under it, because man 
is a individual endowed with dignity, in the Kantian sense: that which cannot be 
exchanged for anything. In other words, vaccines are a response to nature's need, saving 
lives, but they are still an instrument subject to modern critical rationality.  
It is also possible, finally, simply to have confidence in the state. In the world that 
is the product of the Hegelian rational principle in which reason, State and freedom would 
be equivalent. In human progress, reason ends up being found in justified power, and 
policies are positive by the fact of their proposal. Beneath the surface of what we 
recognize, de facto, this element of trust is very strong.  
In the face of technology, or against a state of reason, it is becoming strange to 
affirm principles that can be opposed erga omnes, to reaffirm the rights of the individual, 
who constructs and proposes, that questions and doubts, that has a real and concrete life. 
I believe that it is the task of today's philosophy to return to modernity in the sense of 
vindicating the constituent individual. In short, to reject the minority of age, or state 
described by Kant, in which we do not want to think for ourselves, we are afraid of 
freedom. Cartesian doubt admits rational uncertainty which, despite the initial appearance 
of attacking any rigorist approach, reaffirms the position of dignity of the individual. 
There is a certain hopelessness in the opposition to the technocratic criterion 
because there is a feeling of swimming against the current. A certain desolation in the 
critical position on principle of power. But it's about not forgetting Benjamin when he 
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teaches us that exceptionality, theoretical rights in the face of non-compliance, becomes 
the rule. I imagine that philosophy must always be radical, as a movement of freedom.  
Then, the fact is not admissible as a right, modernity tells us. We cannot, we must 
not, fall into the contradiction of following instrumental reason objectified in technique, 
as Marcuse warned. It is necessary to understand rationally.  
What freedom? 
It forms us to be individuals of rights and freedoms, and to affirm that 
inextinguishable freedom, which forms the essence of life (Grossman). Yes, first and 
foremost the freedom to work, to love, to have a coffee, to plant, to live. 
On the one hand, the modern world has tried to conquer external and internal 
reality by advancing rationally towards universal principles.  Cartesian reason wants and 
demands to uphold rules of validity for every possible society and every imaginable 
circumstance. Therefore, ethics leaves interests behind and risks creating the unhappiness 
that Kant predicted for those who sustain ethical behavior. It admits the existence of 
preferences and satisfactions and historical and social peculiarities, but it does not 
construct the content of rights on the basis of what interests whom, how each one 
understands his happiness and utility. It is not about Fiat iustitia et pereat mundus, which 
only Kant could hold without blinking an eye. If the world ends, justice is not an option, 
because that justice is, of course, unjust. We cannot look the other way on issues such as 
a pandemic by clinging to a theoretical abstract ethic.  
On the other hand, doubt, uncertainty, awareness of error, are all part of a free life. 
We can be scrupulous about truth and yet be certain of nothing, as Russell pointed out in 
his Decalogue. No wonder we are faced with so many unresolved questions about this 
epidemic. The lack of unshakable certainties is part of human reality. For better and for 
worse.  
So, basing social reality on universal rules while acknowledging doubt and 
uncertainty? Fighting a pandemic by general proposals while respecting the private realm 
of existence? Difficult, but that's how it is. Human reality, as symbolic (Casssirer), is 
complex and full of possibilities.  
Solution to the initial question? The answer lies in the framework of universal 
rules for the rational and free individual, who must be for society an end in himself (Kant). 
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Once defined, it is a matter of giving them an effective content, of making them applicable 
to the real problems of the individual and social world. Even before the same products of 
science and work. Then the composition is the pact and the application is given in the 
world under the conditions of human cognizability. 
The theory of the social pact of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Rawls, others (there is 
a historical complexity that gives rise to the theory, see Campos, 2019): it is the modern 
proposal to find the principles of justice. The imaginary situation in which men would 
contract rights and duties to form a society, based on principles that would determine 
what mutual cessions would be made. Fleeing from the state of nature prior to the 
contract, where everyone can do everything so that everyone is insecure, men agree to 
form a final and legitimate authority, the State. Its aim: to provide security and promote 
collective goods. As rational beings they would arrive at social norms valid for all 
hypothetical rational beings.  
Then, we would give up a part of the rights so that the whole, and especially the 
fundamental ones, would be guaranteed. But no one would voluntarily enter into a pact 
that did not guarantee physical and moral integrity. Any signature in any other sense, or 
acquiescence, would be a dead letter. Thus, Locke raises the right to change the ruler who 
fails to comply with the fundamental core of freedoms and even Hobbes admits that there 
is this area of preservation that no one yields to the State. Rousseau speaks to us, finally, 
of the duty of freedom as consubstantial to being a man.  
 Therefore, the fair general rule is that the State is entitled to impose collective 
measures that are in the common interest, but only if and only if they do not fall within 
the fundamental core of rights: physical and moral integrity, which implies the right to 
decide how to maintain them. Moral too, because physical integrity is as important for a 
symbolic being as the dignity consubstantial to a conscious and rational being. Which 
implies freedom, and freedom specifically to define oneself and set one's values. So 
vaccines cannot be compulsory if that imposition contravenes integrity, and they can be 
compulsory if they do not do the above and, in addition, they represent a justified defence 
of the collective welfare. It is never a question of the physical imposition of the vaccine, 
which is morally harmful (in the case of a minor this requires analysis), but of the rational 
limits to the behaviour of the person who has decided not to undergo the treatment. That 
is to say, partial isolation, a mask, impossibility of certain jobs: whatever is strictly 
necessary for the collective interest, according to rational proof. Nor can a personal 
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conviction prevent the collective obligation, for then there would be none. But no act of 
the State can go against conviction as such. 
This is the ethical answer. However, it is not yet possible to answer the question 
about the obligatory nature of vaccines against Covid-19. Within the framework of the 
realization of freedoms, decisions, individual and social, are taken in an environment of 
uncertainty. Affirming a norm is not equivalent to agreeing on its application: what is 
harmful or beneficial belongs to the human realm of knowledge. Therefore, of social 
discussion, which should be a rational debate with the characteristics assigned to it by 
Habermas. But does it tend not to be? Has the world of internet, networks and media 
increased the cacophony? 
It is true that knowing the facts can be enough in some cases, when the force of 
the data speaks for itself (Arendt). But technical transformation and the construction of 
laws are not facts, but are or proceed from symbolic constructions. A vaccine, any medical 
treatment, depends on a set of scientific laws that explain and predict, and for which there 
is always an expectation of truth, but not absolute certainty. We often think that science 
gives exact solutions, but we forget that science has its history and this is the history of 
error. This does not detract from its merit, but on the contrary: as a human attempt to 
make progress in a well-founded way. 
Therefore, it is impossible to universally decide the problem posed, like any other 
relevant question of individual and collective obligations, without agreeing on the 
obligatory nature of accepting what we socially and historically share as justified 
knowledge. It is not possible to conclude outside the framework of accepted human 
knowledge. We are children of our time.  
From modernity onwards, we must stick to science, understanding that science is 
a perpetual debate in which reasonable truths are established, but not absolutely certain. 
Science is the attempt of a limited being to reach the truth that is always far away. But, 
as Popper affirmed, it is the only thing that allows us to correct errors, to move away from 
simple self-interested conjectures.   
So, isn't the central core of freedoms emptied by means of cognitively constructed 
facts? That is to say, by deciding on the obligation of a common epistemological criterion 
we could be depriving the set of rights and freedoms of any basis. Does socially affirming 
and believing in a given standard of knowledge allow us to force its realization? But, if 
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we discard justified knowledge as a reference and enter into what we think subjectively, 
is it possible that the obligations that form us as a political society and originate the State 
are not skipped by each and everyone on the basis of their beliefs? The social contract 
implies, then, an agreement on the knowledge that we consider the basis of the social 
world. Then, personal beliefs and values that do not fit into this standard remain in the 
private sphere, accepting them only with personal validity, but not social insofar as they 
prevent the development of the collective good and the preservation of rights and liberties. 
However, what is science? To say that it is the corpus established by the 
community of researchers, that which is recognized by the established scientific literature, 
implies taking us back to a social criterion of conformity. To a possible situation of power. 
For example, access to publications and media depends on people who decide. Are we 
suddenly in the problem of the Platonic philosopher-ruler? Knowing the truth, he was in 
power by the fact of contemplating it, but no one could decide if it was true because it 
was a contradiction in terms. Let us imagine a fervent believer in Orwellian neo-language 
at the helm of science. Yes, it's a gross exaggeration, but it gives away the potential 
problem. 
There cannot be effectiveness in universal ethical norms, a real guarantee of rights 
and freedoms, without an agreement in free society with open debate on justified 
knowledge. Justified seems to be a value that, in the social world, refers to the truth that 
we understand as public reason: intersubjective.  
 This shows that the corpus of knowledge that we must accept, beyond our most 
private convictions, is a social product and that the pact establishes freedom of thought 
and expression and a prohibition of the domination of social discourse by anyone, much 
less the State. Only under these conditions, in an open and rational debate, can the original 
social contract survive. As soon as someone controls in an interested way, whether we 
recognize it or not, what we think, it will be impossible to guarantee that rights and 
freedoms are preserved, as well as that social measures respond to the collective welfare. 
Science is the daughter of freedom and it is it that, in fact, allows us to build a society of 
universal norms based on the guarantee of fundamental rights. Ethics sets the universal 
norm, science or intersubjectively controllable knowledge determines the effective and 
real content of the norm. 
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 So? The Covid vaccines have been licensed in a shorter time than usual. They 
have been subjected to inductive tests and have confirmed their relatively high efficacy 
and low risk in limited time. From the point of view of scientific confirmation and 
falsifiability, not enough time has passed for observation of a sufficiently large sample 
(vaccines would take about ten years). This does not imply anything negative considering 
the circumstances, but it does imply that the prescription is scientifically provisional until 
then. It can be dismissed as unreasonable to reject the vaccine on the basis of possible, 
but so far not real or apparent, long-term negative effects, but it cannot be refuted. 
Emphasis can be placed on its tangible benefits in the face of a dangerous and contagious 
disease, in the face of perceived possible, but not substantiated future effects. Yes, but 
this is not decisive. We can appeal to the idea of collective responsibility and not putting 
others at risk (referring to scientific studies of contagion), but each person retains the right 
to decide. 
Refusing to take these vaccines is not equivalent to a statement like "the Earth is 
flat". Again: the statements "smallpox vaccine may be unsafe" and "Covid-19 vaccine 
may be unsafe" do not have the same truth value. So the term denialist is absurd, as such. 
We must remember that practical reasonableness depends on the rational decision 
criterion we adopt. 
What does this mean in terms of the obligatory nature of these preventive 
treatments? Simply that their social usefulness is limited by the scope of integrity, with 
each person being free to decide. Their use, therefore, is technical-sanitary and is 
conditioned to strict necessity, given the circumstances. Does this reduce the scope of 
their obligatory nature? Yes. Vaccines are not universally enforceable as a matter of 
principle because they do not meet the standard of final scientific compliance. They are 
recommended, advisable, even including possible consequences of authorisation and 
prohibition in real, everyday life. Differences in contagion or hospital care pressure may 
justify, with reasoned justification, the imposition of limitation measures. 
Isn't the key to this the official authorization, emergency or not? No, because then, 
we make social obligations and rights depend on an instance that depends directly on the 
State. We would be in a pre-Hobbesian state. Power cannot enter into the core of 
fundamental rights, because people have not ceded them. It cannot be the origin of the 
norms and the judge of their validity. Who signs the pact: the individual. Who is the main 
origin and destination of the validity of the norm: the individual. 
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In short, there is no universal ethical obligation to impose vaccination because it 
does not exceed the conditions of the original pact, given the justified scientific 
knowledge we have, which we reached through an open debate and a consensual 
methodology. Therefore, it becomes a question of scientific technique its 
recommendation and the strict limitations that may generate not to give it.  
In general, we are in the permanent debate, where we as a society shape our reality. 
We need to give global and effective answers to health problems of the utmost 
importance. We start from dignity in order to approach what is good for society, precisely 
within the framework of freedom of thought and expression. Only in this society of free 
and equal individuals, who agree and wish to reach mutually advantageous agreements, 
is it possible to outline a fair and effective sphere of collective obligations and policies. 
There is a certain gratification in that we accompany each other and discuss, exchange 
(Arendt) in order, perhaps, to arrive at the hope in history of which Benjamin spoke to us. 
A global pandemic, with the terrible consequences of disease and death, tests what we as 
a society are and intend to develop.  
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